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Abstract - This paper investigates the role of 
government in providing education, especially at the 
regional and local level. The public (or semi-public) 
good nature of education and the presence of 
externalities in the production and consumption process 
can lead to situations of market failure. Consequently 
the market can be driven to solutions that are not 
socially efficient and that’s the fundamental reason to 
defend the public provision of education. But there is 
also a role to be developed by the private school, in this 
market.  
Locally, the economic analysis points to an important 
public role in the provision of educational services, 
especially at the level of basic education. The 
justification is based mainly on grounds of fairness, that 
is, the more or less universal access to the benefits of 
education being the central issue. 
 
1. Introduction 
The present study aims to investigate the role of 
government in providing education, especially at the 
regional and local level. 
Despite the different levels of state participation 
in the educational market worldwide, it is undisputed 
that this presence today is very significant, either by 
the volume of financial resources used, either by the 
political discussion involved in the definition of the 
goals and other issues relating to the availability and 
operation-modalities of the education system, to the 
interested parties.  
The discussion then goes irremediably into a 
“dual” analysis of efficiency versus equity. In this 
sense, our analysis intends to inquire about the 
particular characteristics of functioning of this market 
that can lead to socially inefficient equilibrium 
solutions, and thus justify the presence of the state as 
regulator. 
The work is carried out in four points. The first 
section introduces the concept of externalities. The 
second attempts to frame education as a public good 
and discusses the market failures that are associated 
with the presence of externalities. The third makes 
the analysis of external effects in the education 
market that justify the public provision of education. 
The fourth point addresses the issue of efficiency vs. 
equity in the market mechanism and includes some 
considerations regarding the public provision of 
education in a local context. 
1)  The “Gallery Of Externalities” 
The concept of externalities is, perhaps, one of 
the most inaccurate of the economic literature. 
Despite the extensive literature on externalities, the 
definitions are few and generally unsatisfactory. 
Many scholars do not even define the phenomenon, 
identifying it only by its consequences and by 
enumerating a long list of examples. It’s the "gallery 
of externalities". 
Yet, the concept is not new. Introduced by 
Marshall in the famous "Principles of Economics" 
(1890), it benefited from a strong controversy in the 
20s and 30s of the last century. Highlighted, here, are 
the contributions of Knight, Young and Pigou and, 
later, the effort of multiple authors such as Meade, 
Viner, Scitovsky, Baumol and Oates, among others, 
to generalize the concept. The 60s and 70s went as 
the scene of an abortion of the consensus previously 
generated. After the controversial analysis of Coase, 
in the early 60s, and the development of the so-called 
Property Rights paradigm, the discussion would not 
ever be the same. The discussion about the paper of 
the Government in the process of internalization of 
the externalities took a new breath. And, there are, 
still, significant differences in the classification of the 
various types of externalities. 
In a general approach, we can say that we are in 
the presence of external economies (or diseconomies) 
whenever the utility of an agent is influenced by the 
utilities of other agents, that is, the decision of an 
agent depends on and is influenced by the decisions 
of others; or when a given agent can not appropriate 
all the benefits that he creates or is not forced to pay 
all the damages that generates for the community. 
This idea is present in the definition of 
externalities of Baumol and Oates (1975) by two 
conditions: 
o We are in the presence of externalities when the 
utility or production of an individual includes 
real variables whose values are chosen by others 
(individuals, corporations, government) without 
particular attention to the effects on his welfare. 
o The decision-maker whose work affects the 
utility or production function of others, does not 
receive (or pay) in compensation for that activity, 
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an amount equal to the marginal costs or benefits 
that result. 
This definition leads us to the element of general 
agreement: the externalities are the cause of the 
divergence between private profit and social benefit 
(or private cost/social cost) and lead to situations 
where market mechanisms do not lead to optimal 
allocation of the resources. 
The General Equilibrium Theory postulates that 
assuming the hypotheses of perfect competition in the 
market and perfect divisibility of goods and factors, 
the market forces leads to a situation of Pareto-
optimum, so that any change of behavior from an 
individual or company and the impact on the welfare 
or income from other individuals or companies is 
transmitted through the system of prices.  
Exceptions include, however, a number of 
situations where there is direct interdependence 
between agents operating outside the market. It is in 
this line of thought, that Meade (1952) defines 
external economies. For this author the external 
economies  exist when the output (x1) of a firm 
depends not only on inputs used (l1, c1, ...) but also 
from the output (x2) and the factors used (l2, c2, ... ) 
within another company or group of companies, that 
is, x1 = F (l1, c1, ..., x2, l2, c2). This is a situation of 
direct interdependence between producers. The 
example of the apples and the bees, provided by the 
author, is now a classic. The “Fable of the Bees” put 
in evidence the way that, the near presence of a bee-
keeper producer operation, creates a better result in a 
farm of apples production. In fact, the bees, 
facilitating the polinization of apples flowers, 
generate a surplus in terms of apples farm profit. That 
is reflected in the microeconomic production function 
of the apples firm. 
However, this clear situation of direct 
interdependence among producers is not unique. 
Bourguinat and Scitovsky also mention a number of 
other situations of interdependence that are now part 
of the extensive gallery of externalities.  
Bourguinat (1964) referred the situations in 
which the satisfaction of an individual may depend 
not only on his consumption or effort but also from 
outside influences that can come from three 
categories of agents: 
o Producers: we find the example of the external 
economies created by an industry making some 
infrastructures that benefit the in-habitants of a 
region, without the capacity of appropriating the 
benefits created or, conversely, the external 
diseconomies resulting from certain polluting 
activities that generate noise or smoke or toxic 
waste. 
o Government: all benefits available to the 
community by the state, including the so-called 
public goods and services (scientific research 
programs, among others) constitute, for the 
population, partial external economies, since 
there is no equivalence between the disutility of 
tax incumbency and the usefulness of services 
received. 
o Consumers: the interdependence of consumers 
leads to situations where the satisfaction level of 
an individual is affected not only by his level of 
product consumption, but also by the satisfaction 
of other consumers with higher incomes, often 
leading to imitation and contagious effects. 
Particularly interested in externalities at the 
consumption level are, also, Buchanan et Stubblebine 
(1962). For these authors, externalities exist as long 
as the utility of an individual A depends not only on 
the activities he chooses (x1, x2,...) but also from an 
activity (Z) chosen by another person B. 
Scitovsky (1954) extends the concept into 
situations in which this interdependence operates 
through market mechanisms. The definition of 
external economies then arises in terms of profit. 
Thus, whenever the profits of a company (P1) does 
not depend only on the production itself (x1) and 
inputs used (l1, c1,...) but also from the production 
(x2) and other inputs (l2, c2 , ...) from other 
companies, we invoke the presence of externalities: 
P1 = G (x1, l1, c1, ..., x2, l2, c2 ...).  
In this case, the external economies work 
through the market, affecting prices directly. For 
example, the investment in an industry lead to the 
expansion of its productive capacity and can lead to 
falling prices of its products and rising prices of 
inputs used, and that benefit, respectively, the 
consumers of these products and the suppliers of 
inputs. Note that those agents will not pay the 
equivalent compensation. We are in the presence of 
so-called pecuniary external economies, a 
classification that comes from Viner, as opposed to 
so-called technological external economies that 
correspond to those given by Meade. 
2. Public Goods and “The Anatomy of 
Market Failure” 
According to Bator (1958), externalities are 
basically market failures whose anatomy should be 
investigated. The market failure is understood here as 
the failure of a system of prices and market rules 
designed to signal the desirability or non-desirability 
of a given activity. This is to be evaluated with 
respect to the solutions of a social welfare function 
that is maximized. 
The central theorem of the modern Theory of 
Welfare, known as the Duality Theorem, tells us that 
under certain restrictive assumptions about 
technology, consumer spending and motivations of 
the producers, the equilibrium conditions that 
characterize a system of competitive markets has a 
perfect correspondence with the requirements of  
Pareto-efficiency, as we mentioned. The problem of 
maximizing the welfare leads us to determine a set of 
"shadow prices" which have the analytical 
characteristics of prices, wages, interest rates and 
rents. But this implies that the calculation of the 
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decentralized market account for all economic costs 
and benefits relevant to the welfare function. 
According to Bator, this duality can fail.  
o Either because the market misses the signals/ 
incentives sent to the system, or by the structure 
more or less monopolized the market. We find 
ourselves in what he calls the technical 
externalities: situations where due to various 
causes (in general, problems of indivisibility and 
interdependence) market private and social costs, 
or benefits, differ, in the margin and in total 
values, whether the benefits. 
o Because, due to institutional imperfections of 
organization and capacity limitations of 
accounting, some inputs are not properly 
accounted for. There is, here, a flaw that Bator 
calls "failure by enforcement." The author refers 
to a series of situations where the market fails in 
the extent that one factor is not paid - including 
fisheries and all situations of free access to 
natural resources. In this type of market failed 
matches a group of externalities means that the 
"ownership externalities". 
o Either because it simply does not exist. It is the 
so-called "failure of existence" and that 
corresponds to the case of public goods.  
It is this latter aspect that interests us especially. 
For Samuelson, the quality that defines a public 
good is the consumption of each individual does not 
imply any subtract-ability in the consumption of the 
good by another individual. In this case, the formal 
conditions of the marginal rate of substitution that 
define the frontier of possibilities of Pareto-efficient 
utility does not lead to any kind of vectors of market 
prices used when a routine, useful for establishing the 
output-mix and for the distribution in a decentralized 
organization, is working.  
In a simple language: A strong argument for state 
intervention in education derives exactly from the 
nature of public or semi-public good. The definition 
of public good and its differentiation from private 
goods can be seen as follows: A pure public good has 
two main properties: non-rivalry and non-exclusion. 
In the case of education, we are faced with goods and 
services with public goods nature: non-exclusion (no 
user can prevent someone else to use, too, the 
educational services) and non-rivalry in consumption 
(the use of services by a consumer does not decrease, 
at least significantly, the amount available for 
consumption by other consumers). In fact, individuals 
may act as "free riders" and acquire the services at 
zero prices. The presence of positive externalities in 
this case is evident, in that the consumer does not pay 
for using the service a price equal to marginal benefit. 
The greater the degree of rivalry (that is 
associated with the idea of scarcity), and the degree 
of exclusion (associated with the idea of property), 
plus the public good approaches a pure public good. 
It is evident that the pure public goods are rare. 
As for education, its inclusion as a public good 
depends on the actual educational level. At the level 
of compulsory schooling (the mandatory first years of 
school-education), this formation is seen as an 
absolute desideratum and absolutely necessary to 
prevent. So it that is often seen as a real public good, 
especially in European societies where the "welfare 
state" is the rule. In these societies the rule is the 
almost full government provision of education at this 
level of education. 
However, the same cannot be said for the post-
compulsory education. First, financially it would be 
very complicated in the context of current public 
policy, think on an absolute public provision of 
education, particularly at the university level. 
Simultaneously, it is recognized that at this level, the 
degree of responsibility for the education of young-
adult and adult should have to pass to a more 
personal level of motivation and financial 
participation. 
In terms of “ownership” and speaking about non-
rivalry characteristics, it can be assumed that this 
level of post-compulsory education is to some extent, 
not rival. A set of individuals can take ownership of 
both the teacher's knowledge. However, the 
classroom may have limitations in terms of space 
available for the attendance of students. The teacher 
capacity to care and of tutoring is limited. 
Regarding the exclusion, the situation is more 
debatable. If education and teaching were of 
universal free access then the exclusion would be 
impossible but if, for example, at the level of higher 
education, given the existence of "numerus clausus" 
and the existence of tuition (even at lower cost) the 
exclusion is already a fact, in this sense, we can 
approach  a semi-public or even private provision. In 
fact, what usually happens is that, with limited entries 
in the public university, the excess demand will have 
to be met with private provision of university 
education. 
There are still issues of ideological nature. Those 
have to do with the personal attitude/position in the 
face of state intervention in these areas, not forgetting 
that Education Policy can be an important element of 
social regulatory function. In fact, corporate 
propaganda reflects the interests of dominant social 
groups and is central to social reproduction models. 
Beyond the discussion of higher or lower 
economic efficiency of the State's economic 
performance as an agent, there is a political 
discussion about the social functions of the state that 
is always present in this debate and that includes the 
important issue of fairness that we deal ahead . 
3. Externalities and the Provision of 
Public Education 
Given the foregoing, the question should be how 
far the public provision of education turns out to be. 
That means we must identify the externalities 
associated with the goods and services in education 
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(and the market failures associated with the education 
market), to justify the presence of the Government. 
According to Chagas-Lopes (2004) and Blaug 
(1991) we can identify at least the following 
externalities associated with education: 
In terms of positive externalities, we noted that 
the skilled and highly qualified worker or manager is 
a factor of productivity gains and ability to attract 
more dynamic capital: with the introduction of new 
technologies, rather than the logic of competition for 
low wages; with reflections on the overall 
development of society. Social marginal benefits are 
clearly superior to the marginal private benefits. 
Likewise, it can be said that education works in 
terms of the security and safety of a higher level of 
income. Individuals with higher levels of education 
perform usually better paid professions, increasing 
levels of disposable income, which offset, in terms of 
potential demand, the demographic problems of steep 
decline of the workforce in countries where the 
"Welfare State" works the best. The existence of 
higher income levels are still an important support for 
obtaining funds for the governments, through taxes 
and other fees, which keep the public social policies 
(including education, itself). 
We may also apply the multiplier effects of 
education and research and development on the 
endogenous growth of countries as well as the 
multiplier effects on consumption of public goods 
(such as health or culture) that stem from the 
existence of a literate and educated population. 
It should be noted that, from the perspective of 
the individual who has free (or lower cost than the 
actual price) education, there is a positive externality 
clearly identifiable in that their marginal benefit is 
clearly higher than its marginal cost because private 
compensation to society that is paid is not the 
equivalent of the benefit that results from increased 
individual improvement becoming from their 
training. 
In terms of negative externalities it is also 
possible to highlight some aspects ranging from the 
exclusion of the non-qualified individuals of the new 
information societies (where the multiplicity of 
sources and forms of learning turns out to be a 
disadvantage for the "new illiterates” of the TICs-
Technologies of information and communication); to 
the migration and plunder of the high qualifications 
from the developing countries to the developed 
countries, a veritable brain-drain that inevitably 
leaves the poorest and least developed countries 
disqualified. 
In the same direction, we can identify the 
purpose of demonstration / imitation effect that lead 
to the adoption, by the poor countries, of the 
standards of rich countries with high consumption. 
That leads to the depletion of natural resources and to 
the jeopardizing of the sustainability of the 
development process. The globalization of culture 
and education is, at this level, a factor of considerable 
importance. 
Apart from the issue of the presence of 
externalities and their consequences in the poor 
functioning of the education market, we also 
highlight a key aspect concerning the shortcomings 
of the education market: their reduced transparency 
and the difficulties that arise due to problems of 
asymmetric information. In this sense, for some 
authors, the active intervention of the state is justified 
in this market.  
In fact, education is a “merit” good and one of 
the reasons for the apparent dysfunction of the market 
is just the critical situation of being a good for which 
it is difficult to judge quality. Students themselves 
have difficulty in choosing. Government intervention 
is justified because the design of this choice is 
necessary. Information does not reach every 
consumer on equal terms. The very ability to decode 
the message that is associated with the 
"announcement" of educational available services is 
different between different social status levels. 
Asymmetric information is still visible in that the 
responsible for educational provision have a more 
secure notion of the product quality they are offering, 
when compared to what it is provided to potential 
consumers. To this extent, students can be led to 
demand for lower-quality institutions or courses with 
few career options (with surplus students compared 
to the expected demand in the labor market, etc.). 
Therefore, the state should regulate the supply of 
education. 
Moreover, throughout the training process, 
individuals may have needs that can only pay income 
in the future and raises the possibility of using the 
banking system. But for this system, probably the risk 
of these operations is high, given the amortization 
period to be extended and given the lack of 
knowledge about the future. Here, too, the 
intervention of "social management of risk" by the 
State is important. 
Summarizing:  The need to consider the effects 
of externalities, or the need to overcome the 
difficulties of a market with imperfections, all seem 
to be reasons to justify the Government regulation of 
education. How far can go the provision of education 
by the state ends up being more then a matter of 
financial resources available, and obviously an 
ideological issue that results from a more or less 
liberal view about the way we understand the activity 
of the agent - State in the economy and in the society. 
4. The Efficiency versus Equity Issue.  
Local Provision of Education 
As we said, the issue of education provision by 
the state cannot remain only in the eternal debate 
about the greater or lesser efficiency of the 
Government in allocating resources.  
Admittedly, there are interesting arguments that 
seek to justify private provision of education as the 
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traditional arguments of the gains derived from price 
and quality competition and freedom of choice by 
consumers. 
However, the main justification for state 
intervention in the education system comes to the aim 
of "raising the general level of education and 
training" that is intended in most modern societies. At 
stake here are issues of equitable distribution of 
income and development gains that the competitive 
economy has difficulties in securing. 
We get both issues of social cohesion, between 
social groups or between different regions and 
locations. 
At the bottom, the fundamental issue is how to 
ensure equal opportunities of access to education by 
the less privileged  by not allowing their lack of 
means and any other access problems to create a 
situation of absolute impediment of realization of 
their capacities and of integration in the competitive 
economy. Somehow, we need a kind of positive 
discrimination that favors the least protected 
individuals, explicitly, in the system. 
It is precisely in this level of "equalizing" 
opportunities that the regulatory activity of the state 
and public provision of education, are more justified. 
For this purpose the state may resort to various forms 
of assistance (see Chagas Lopes, 2004): 
o Through the finance system, by using various 
social support alternatives, from “free” and 
universal education system, to school vouchers 
or school loans to pay in the long-term, 
scholarships, school residencies and other forms 
of social school support (food, transportation, 
etc.); 
o Construction of the necessary educational 
infrastructure (schools, sports halls, libraries, 
roads, etc.); 
o By seeking to combat school dropouts; 
o Strategy to prevent the monopolization of the 
education market in certain areas of science and 
at various spatial scales (national, regional, 
local); 
o By direct intervention in the management of 
schools and regulation of relations between 
public education and private education; 
o Production of information relating to the 
education system and its dissemination; 
o Through the legislative process: taking explicitly 
a positive discrimination to the poor, facilitating, 
for example, certain types of access to several 
areas and levels of education services. 
 In the local context, these issues of equity in the 
market access and of public provision of education 
services can take an interesting shape. Several issues 
are to be answered. Is it justified the public provision 
of education at the local level? On what level(s) of 
education? Why? With what fundament? What is the 
role of local government in the quality of the 
education system? What are the problems that the 
local authorities face in these areas? What are the 
difficulties in the relationship with central 
Government?  
The usual answers in some tests to validate this 
analysis, in the Portuguese case (see Oliveira, 2007), 
enhance the justification of public provision of 
education at all levels of education, based on criteria 
of fairness - "that all citizens have access to 
education." Secondly, the local Governments have 
usually assigned important responsibilities in terms of 
primary education (Kindergarten and 1st cycle), 
coming this public provision of education services to 
play an important role, especially in matters of school 
transport, school social work, maintenance of 
infrastructure and support for complementary 
activities (as after-school activities).These skills 
involve important financial resources in the local 
context. Likewise, it is called the attention for the 
critical tension between the Central Government “that 
only distributes responsibilities to local power” but 
does not accompany this devolution of powers in the 
education sector with the “decentralization" in 
financial terms.   
5. Concluding Remarks 
The public (or semi-public) good nature of 
education and the presence of externalities in the 
production and consumption process in the education 
market can lead to situations where the market can be 
driven to solutions that are not socially efficient. 
That’s an important reason to defend the public 
provision of education. 
But there is also a role to be developed by the 
private school, in this market. The questions are to be 
put in terms of price and quality of the service, but 
also on equity grounds, the more or less universal 
access to the benefits of education being the central 
issue. 
Locally, the economic analysis points to an 
important public role in the provision of educational 
services, especially at the level of basic education. 
The justification for public provision based mainly on 
grounds of fairness, "equality of citizens' access to 
education." There are still some problems in the 
complex relationship between Central Government 
and Local Government with regard to financial 
issues, including the adequacy of transfers of funds to 
the local institutions to enable them to cope with the 
new powers that are being conferred in the fields of 
Education. 
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